align more closely with Voting Games than with Prisoner's Dilemmas, Games of Chicken, and Assurance Games.
The Tragedy of the Commons and the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma
Hardin (1968) argues that, just like herdsmen add cattle to a commons up to the point that is beyond its carrying capacity, the human population is expanding beyond the earth's carrying capacity. In both cases, there is an individual benefit in adding one animal or one human offspring, but the costs to the collective exceed the benefits to the individual:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all.
It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another ... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. (Hardin 1968 (Hardin : 1244 Let us construct an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. Suppose that each player derives the same payoff from cooperating and the same payoff from defecting when j other players cooperate and (n -1 -j) other players defect. In Figure 1 , we plot the payoff from cooperating-U[Cooperation]-and the payoff from defecting-U[Defection]-as a function of the proportion of (n -1) players defecting. U [Cooperation] profile is lower than each person's payoff in many other profiles, e.g. in the profile in which all cooperate, but also in some profiles with mixed cooperation and defection.
Hence, the profile in which each person plays her individually rational strategy is strongly suboptimal. That is, there are profiles whose payoffs are strictly preferred by all to the payoffs in the equilibrium profile. This brings us to the core lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma, viz. individual rationality does not lead to collective rationality.
If there were a single center of control we would certainly not choose the equilibrium profile, since it is strongly suboptimal relative to some other profiles.
We could fill in the story of the herdsmen so that it is accurately represented by Figure 1 . Defectors are herdsmen who each send an animal to the commons to feed. Cooperators refrain from doing so-e.g. they barn feed their animal. And their respective payoffs are precisely as is laid out in the graph. To do so, we need to make one assumption which is slightly unnatural, viz. that there is a negative externality of defection (commons feeding) on cooperation (barn feeding).
This may be the case, but it is more natural to think of barn feeding as having a fixed payoff. If we assume that there is a fixed payoff, then there are three possibilities, as illustrated in Figure U [Cooperation] (1) The individual payoffs of the All Defect equilibrium are greater than the payoff of barn feeding (bottom horizontal line), in which case the equilibrium profile is not strongly suboptimal relative to any other profile. Hence we no longer have a Prisoner's Dilemma.
(2) The individual payoffs of the All Defect equilibrium equal the payoff of barn feeding (middle horizontal line), in which case the equilibrium profile is not strongly suboptimal relative to any other profile (though it is weakly suboptimal relative to all other profiles.) This is a degenerate Prisoner's Dilemma.
(3) The individual payoffs of the All Defect profile are lower than the payoff of barn feeding (top horizontal line), in which case this profile is no longer an equilibrium. Hence we no longer have a Prisoner's Dilemma but rather a Game of Chicken, as will become clear below.
A more natural interpretation of the game in Figure 1 is littering. However many other people litter (Defect), each person prefers to litter rather than carry their empty beer cans back home (Cooperate). But with each additional item of litter, the town becomes less and less pleasant for litterer and non-litterer alike. This example is actually a clearer example of a tragedy of the commons that fits the mold of an nperson Prisoner's Dilemma.
The Assurance Game

Skyrms (2001) takes the following quote from Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality:
If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple... Following Rousseau, an Assurance Game is also named a "Stag Hunt". In this game, it is beneficial to cooperate assuming that others cooperate as well. However, if I cannot be assured that others will cooperate then it is better to defect. That is, if I can trust that others will hunt deer with me, then I am better off hunting deer with them; But if they do not stay by their station and decide to lash out and hunt hare, then I am better off abandoning my station as well and hunt hare.
We present the n-person version of the Assurance Game in Figure 3 . In this game, it is better to cooperate when there is a low proportion of defectors and it is better to defect when there is a high proportion of defectors. The game has two equilibria, viz. All Cooperate and All Defect. The payoff to each in the All Cooperate equilibrium is higher than in the All Defect equilibrium. To interpret this in terms of a tragedy of the commons, we could stipulate that people can either choose to jointly work a commons with the promise of a large harvest if all participate or work some small garden plots by themselves with the sure outcome of a small harvest. If we cannot be assured that others will cooperate then the commons will remain untapped. In this case the tragedy of the commons comes about due to neglect rather than over-usage, due to lack of care rather than to 
The Game of Chicken
In the Game of Chicken two cars drive straight at each other forcing the other one to swerve. If one drives straight and the other swerves then the one who drives straight wins and the one who swerves loses. If they both swerve then it's a tie. And clearly, if they both drive straight then tragedy ensues. Let defection be driving straight and cooperation be swerving. Then the best response to defection is cooperation and the best response to cooperation is defection. In the n-person Game of Chicken ( Figure   4 ), at low levels of defection, defection has a higher payoff than cooperation. At high levels of defection, cooperation has a higher payoff than defection. U [Cooperation] cooperation is between 0 and 1 defector. But this is just an artefact of the story. In the commons example, defecting (commons feeding) remains rational at high and midrange levels of cooperation (barn feeding). We can put the intersection point between the line for defection and cooperation at any point in the graph and tell a fitting story.
In an n-person Games of Chicken, the equilibria in pure strategies are the profiles at the intersection point of the lines for cooperation and defection (at least for the continuous case). In low-level defection profiles, i.e. profiles to the left of the intersection point, it is better for a cooperator to unilaterally deviate to defection.
In high-level defection profiles, i.e. profiles to the right of the intersection point, it is better for a defector to unilaterally deviate to cooperation. Only the profiles at the intersection point are equilibria.
How does tragedy ensue? There are two reasons. First, the equilibria are not welcome equilibria. In Moulin's example of the overgrazing of the commons, the intersection point is the point at which the commons are so depleted that it makes no difference whether the next herder brings his animal to the commons or barn feeds.
Let the intersection point be at m < n players. Second, there is a coordination problem. When the herdsmen have to choose independently to bring their animal to the commons, they cannot coordinate who will and will not send their animal to the commons. They have no ground to prefer one of the equilibria in pure strategies over another. If they resort to an equilibrium in randomized strategies, i.e. they all choose to send their animal to the commons with a particular probability, then we may be lucky and end up with a number of commons feeders that is lower than the depletion point, but we may also be unlucky and end up with a number of commons feeders that is higher than the depletion point. Similarly, in the actual Game of Chicken, our luck runs out when all defect, i.e. go straight.
Three-Person Games
Let us consider three-person games for the three types of games that can represent tragedies of the commons. Start with the three-person Prisoner's Dilemma in Table 1 .
There is a persistent preference for defection over cooperation (D C) in the Prisoner's Dilemma, whether none, one or both of the other two people are defecting. The equilibrium is at All Defect. To construct an Assurance Game, we can 2 We can also construct an Assurance Game by turning around two preferences, viz. C D when none or one of the other players is defecting. This would not affect the equilibria. And we can also construct a Game of Chicken by turning around two preferences, viz. C D when one or both other players are defecting. Then the equilibria are two players cooperating and one defecting. In terms of the graphs in Figures 3 and 4 , we are just shifting the intersection points. coordinate who will show up to vote, then all is well. They will play an equilibrium strategy with a pivotal player and the social good will be realized. But coordination is precisely the problem. When they cannot coordinate, then they may slide into the All Defect equilibrium and not show up for the vote. We also see the same pattern when voters cast a protest vote for a candidate whom they do not really want to vote in place. They trust that there will be a sufficient number of voters for an acceptable mainstream candidate. But without coordination, it may happen that there will not be a sufficient number and the protest candidate may gain unwanted traction.
There is a history of using games that have the structure of the Voting Game as an analysis of collective action problems. I will survey and discuss this literature before turning to classical tragedies of the commons.
Historical Background of the Voting Game
The name "Voting Game" is inspired by the Simple Voting Game in Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal, Def. 2.1.1. in (1998: 11) which in turn builds on L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954) . A Simple Voting Game is a set of voters and a non-empty set of subsets of the voters which form winning coalitions and every U [Cooperation] superset of a winning coalition is also a winning coalition. E.g. under majority rule, the set of winning coalitions of the set of voters {a, b, c} is {{a, b}, {b, c}, {c, d}, {a, b, c}}. This Simple Voting Game induces a Voting Game as I understand it: if you belong to a minimal winning coalition, i.e. a winning coalition which is such that no proper subset of this winning coalition is itself a winning coalition, then you prefer to cast a vote rather than not to cast a vote; otherwise, you prefer not to cast a vote rather than cast a vote.
The Voting Game has the same structure as the game G3 in Taylor and Ward (1982: 356) , adapted in Taylor (1987: 41) , which is a model for the provision of lumpy public goods (i.e. step goods or threshold goods). Taylor and Ward (1982: 360) and Taylor (1987: 44-45) apply this game to the context of voting. Ward (1990) illustrates the game by adapting the story in Jerome K. 109). They discuss the rationality of making donations for the provision of lumpy and non-lumpy public goods. For lumpy goods, it is rational to donate if and only if there is a chance that the donation will make a difference to the provision of the good, i.e. when the donation might be pivotal. The presentation of the games in terms of payoffs for defection and cooperation as a function of the proportion of defectors (or rather, of cooperators) goes back to Thomas Schelling (1973) . Frohlich et al. (1975: 326-7 ) use this Schelling model (1973) to present a game in which the payoff of defection is greater at low and high level of cooperation whereas the payoff of cooperation is greater at intermediate levels of cooperation, as it is in the Voting Game. They indicate that voting is an extreme case of this game in which cooperation only pays off when there is a level of cooperation that makes a player's vote pivotal and present it as an example of a lumpy good.
Taylor and Ward classify G3, i.e. the Voting Game, as a variant of a three-person Game of Chicken. Their argument is that in G3, as in the Game of Chicken, we have an incentive to pre-commit to defection. Now this is true in the Game of Chicken. As I indicated in f. 1, we can construe two Games of Chicken in the three-person game, depending on the point at which there is a preference switch.
If the game has the structure of the Game of Chicken in our And this game has an optimal equilibrium (Both Cooperate) and a suboptimal equilibrium (Both Defect). Hence, it is not guaranteed that a pre-commitment to defection will lead to the optimal equilibrium. If there is a high level of distrust both remaining players will choose defection. Taylor will respond that rationality prescribes that players choose the optimal equilibrium in the Assurance Game (1987: 19), but it is not clear that rationality alone is sufficient to secure trust.
Hampton analyzes a three-person variant of Hume's Draining the
Meadows as a game that has the same preference structure as the Voting Game, as I will do below. Game of Chicken or a Battle of the Sexes. I take it to be an essential feature of the Game of Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes in the two-person game that defection is the rational response to cooperation and that cooperation is the rational response to defection. This generalizes, for the n-person game, to Defection being the rational response to All Others Cooperate and Cooperation being the rational response to All Others Defect. This feature is missing from the Voting Game and hence it warrants a separate classification.
Three Classical Tragedies of the Commons
We will now look at three classical sources that can readily be interpreted as tragedies of the commons. We start with Aristotle's passage in the Politics. Ostrom (1990: 2) only quotes a short excerpt: " [W] hat is common to the greatest number has the least care The wise men say that they figured that one bucket of water could not be detected when mixed with 99 buckets of milk. Hence, they explain their defection in the following way:
(M.i) They expected all others to cooperate and hence, there was no need for them to cooperate.
Finally, let us turn to Hume who discusses the problem of draining a commonly owned meadow in the section entitled "Of the Origin of Government" in the Treatise, Bk Three, Part II, Section VII:
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common;
because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning of the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the whole burden on others. Political society easily remedies both inconveniences.
We find the same theme in Hume as in Aristotle:
(H.i) It's easier to improve a commons with a few people than with many people.
His reason for this is as follows:
(H.ii) With fewer people, a single defection would be the end of the collective project.
He offers three problems when there are more rather than fewer people, viz.
(H.iii) "know[ing] each other's mind", (H.iv) "concert[ing] so complicated a design", and, (H.v) "execution", that is, of preventing that each other player would "seek a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense" and "lay the whole burden on others."
The Classical Tragedies as Voting Games
These three classical stories all display tragedies of the commons. It concerns the lack of care for commonly owned property or for a resource that, on king's orders, needs independent attention from multiple people. Each of these stories can be construed as a Voting Game. In Mahanarayan's story, when there are few buckets of milk or many buckets of milk in the well, it makes no difference to the prospect of punishment whether one pours milk or water; But there is a critical zone between too few and too many in which one bucket of milk may reasonably make a difference between incurring the wrath of the King or not. In Hume's story, one can envision a critical zone in which cooperation is worthwhile whereas defection is a rational response when there are too few cooperators to carry out the project and too many so that one can safely shirk. And a similar interpretation can be proffered for
Aristotle's attendants in domestic service. 
ii. The Too-Many-Players Explanation
Both Aristotle (A.iii) and Hume (H.i and H.ii) mention that the problem of defection is particularly acute when there are more rather than fewer players. If we read this passage in terms of bargaining theory or cooperative game-theory-i.e. how can rational players come to an agreement about which solution in the optimal set they will settle on-then it is consistent with all games. The greater the number, the harder it is to reach an agreement due to conflicting conceptions of fairness, the desire to hold out, etc.
But we should bracket bargaining theory in our interpretation of this quote. Bargaining theory enters in when Hume's "political society" enters in. The claim here is that, before political society enters in, before we sit down to settle on a collectively rational solution, the problem of defection is more acute when there are many rather than fewer individually rational persons.
So what happens when we contract the set of players in the game from many to fewer players? In a Prisoner's Dilemma, individually rational people will simply defect whether there are more or fewer players. In a Game of Chicken, contracting the set of players would do no more than take out the cooperators and Assurance Game with a single salient optimal equilibrium.
iii. The Lack-of-Trust Explanation
Hume mentions problems of "knowing the minds of others" (H.iii) and of "execution", of others not finding "a pretext" to shirk (H.v).
If we stipulate that the players have common knowledge of rationality, then they do know the minds of others in a Prisoner's Dilemma. They know that all will defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma and so the Prisoner's Dilemma is not a good interpretation of Hume's quote. In a Game of Chicken that reflects a tragedy of the Commons, the expectation is also that many will defect-so many that the commons will be depleted. So also a Game of Chicken is not a good interpretation of Hume's quote. Skyrms (2001: 2) So admittedly an Assurance Game would be defensible in the face of the Trust Argument. The only reservation against this interpretation is that if the collective benefit is sufficiently large and the private benefit sufficiently small, then the optimal equilibrium should be sufficiently salient for the players to have at least some reason to expect that others will cooperate-they have some grounds to know the mind of others and to trust that others won't shirk.
However, knowing the mind of others and shirking are more unsurmountable problems in a Voting Game. There are multiple optimal equilibria and not knowing the minds of others, players do not know whether they are pivotal voters. Furthermore, it is all too easy to succumb to wishful thinking and create a pretext that there are likely to be a sufficient number of cooperators. Or, it is all too easy to succumb to defeatism and say that there are bound to be too many defectors.
In an Assurance Game, trust may be the problem, but at least the saliency of the optimal equilibrium would provide some reason for trust, whereas in a Voting
Game the structure of the game is an open invitation for distrust.
iv. The Private-Benefits Explanation
Aristotle explains the lack of care for commonly owned property on grounds of the fact that our agency is determined by our private benefits and not by the collective good (A.i).
I admit that there is a very natural way of reading this passage on the background of a Prisoner's Dilemma: Individual rationality is what leads to the suboptimal equilibrium of All Defect in the Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas if our agency were determined by collective benefits we would not get caught there. It would also be consistent with a Game of Chicken when we extend the set of players beyond the point of profitable commons use, leading to a sub-optimal equilibrium of Many Defect.
However, there is also a reading of this passage that is consistent with an Assurance Game or a Voting Game. We might say that the preferences that enter into the definition of the game reflect benefits derived from the collective project and from personal projects. The benefits from the collective project are greater than from the individual project. However, we may attach more weight to the smaller benefits from the personal project than the larger benefits from the social project in our deliberation and our agency may be determined by these differential weights. This reading could be placed in the context of an Assurance Game: The smaller benefits from hunting hare have more weight in a player's deliberations than the larger benefits of hunting deer. Similarly, we can also place this reading in the context of a Voting Game: The smaller comforts of not showing up for the vote have more weight than the larger benefit we would derive from the social project of voting the proposal in place. We could invoke the Private-Benefits argument as a kind of myopia that drives us away from the optimal equilibrium towards the suboptimal equilibrium in an Assurance Game. It also drives us away from the optimal equilibria through the lack of coordination, self-deception and defeatism into the suboptimal equilibrium in a Voting Game. But granted, this last explanation is not
decisive and is open to multiple interpretations which can be accommodated by all four games.
Conclusion
Tragedies of the Commons can plausibly be analyzed as Prisoner's Dilemmas, Assurance Games, Games of Chickens and Voting Games. Voting Games can trace their ancestry to the voting power literature on the one hand and to the literature on the provision of lumpy public goods on the other hand. I have looked at three classical sources (Aristotle, Mahanarayan and Hume) 
